In 2010 Ghana introduced a new
public sector pay policy, the Single Spine Pay Policy (SSPP) to resolve 4 key concerns that had hounded public pay
policies in the past. As restated by President Mahama in an address to the
National Forum on the SSPP in August 2013, these concerns include pay
disparities within the public sector; the rising wage bill; multiple pay
negotiations and finally the disconnect between pay and productivity. The SSPP
unlike the Ghana Universal Salary Structure (GUSS) which preceded it hinges on
a single base pay and applies across all public institutions without the opportunity
to opt out; this means internal disparities experienced with the earlier regime
are technically removed while multiple negotiations become redundant. Further
a Public Service Performance Management Monitoring and Evaluation system is
reported to be in the offing to address productivity issues. Thus it would seem
safe, albeit simpleminded to conclude that once “implementation challenges”
currently engaging workers and the government are resolved, the SSPP would
indeed achieve its stated objectives. Regrettably the SSPP's composition and policy prescriptions are unlikely to make it the panacea for Ghana’s public pay
policy blunders.
Take for instance
the consequences for pay administration and labour relations imposed by the different
“pay” components within the policy. Beyond core pay the
SSPP offers 4 categories of “benefits and allowances”. While category 1 is now
consolidated in the base pay all other categories are made out as separate payments.
In category 2 are allowances such as for tools and overtime; funeral grants,
entertainment, medical allowances, motor cycles etc belong to category 3 and finally
category 4 allowances “associated with top management positions” include free
accommodation, unlimited use of fuel and free utilities. Off course some of
these motivational incentives may be justified within our socioeconomic
context but others are clearly a continuation of the
status based reward system inherent in previous public sector pay regimes that
encouraged nepotism rather than productivity and growth. This is not unrelated
to issues of proportionality between pay in the public sector qua public sector
and so-called “Article 71” officers who are exempted from the SSPP.
The SSPP also provides for “market
premiums and inducements”. Inducements are allowances paid to “jobholders who
work in underserved or deprived areas as defined by the FWSC”. No guidelines
for implementation of this component are available yet as far as is known. Market
premiums on the other hand are incentives paid for scarce skills. They are not
subject to pay negotiations and are determined by government discretion within
the constraints of the national budget. The April 2013 government white paper on
market premiums provides that a scarce skill “is one that is in short supply
relative to the demand for it in the labour market within a defined period as
determined by government”.
Undoubtedly the periodic
revision of critical skills and definition of underserved areas is going to be
a challenging game of chess but wrangling between government and workers and
within workers’ bodies over which professions or positions make or drop off the
list is likely to create more agitation on the labour front than is anticipated.
Again as a non-negotiable variable incentive it is questionable whether the
strategy will achieve the specific objective of making the government a more
competitive employer on the labour market.
A more trying
question that arises however is whether a legitimate industrial action may be
grounded on any of the pay components as they stand. The case of the Polytechnic
Teachers’ Association of Ghana (POTAG) makes an interesting example. POTAG and
recently the University Teachers’ Association of Ghana (UTAG) are fighting for the
reversal of a new Ministry of Education policy to replace research allowance,
paid directly to teachers, with a central research support fund. The strike has
been in place for months, causing polytechnics in the country to shut down.
POTAG argues that the allowance was negotiated as part of their conditions of
service. Though a court has ruled that the POTAG strike is legal; it is
uncertain whether the research allowance is to be considered part of the basic
pay of teachers, an allowance, incentive payment or a “work resource” within
the logic of the SSPP; nor is it clear how that should impact the labour regime.
In March 2010 Ghana Trades Union
Congress (GTUC) warned in the GTUC Policy Bulletin Vol. 6 No. 1 that workers would
accept the SSPP “only if it ensures fairness, transparency, consistency and
logic in administration of the salary structure” and that the SSPP would suffer
the fate of the GUSS otherwise. Perhaps that is a position that public sector
pay administrators must revisit, as feverish efforts are being made to secure the
survival and success of the policy.
No comments:
Post a Comment